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The task of resolving all the issues surrounding the subprime mortgage
crisis and subsequent economic downturn is certainly an overwhelming one.
Although most commentators agree that concentrated regulatory efforts of some
sort are necessary to get our national economy healthy and back on track,' no
general consensus has emerged as to which portions of the market the
government should regulate or the form such regulation should take. 2 As a

*

Mr. Waters is the Chairman of the Board of Directors at Rogers, Townsend & Thomas,

PC; Freddie Mac Designated Counsel for South Carolina; Fannie Mae Designated Counsel for
South Carolina; Director of the American Legal and Financial Network (AFN); and a board
member of Committee for Actual Real Estate Solutions (CARES). He has practiced in the area of
residential mortgage foreclosures and loss mitigation since 1976. The author would like to thank
Blaire Lowery, a third-year law student at the University of South Carolina School of Law, for her
assistance with the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Make Regulation Review a Priority, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 26, 2009, at 8,
available
at
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20090125/REG/
301259990 (noting that commentators agree that President Obama must restore public confidence
and suggesting hearings designed to "identify weaknesses in the regulatory framework" and
"provide guidance" on restructuring the regulatory system).
2. Compare Joe Adler, Diverse Views on Revamping Regulation, AMERICAN BANKER, Dec.
29, 2008, at 10, available at 2008 WLNR 24762106 (discussing survey results that highlight
banking executives' differing views on regulation based on bank size), with Floyd Norris,
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practitioner specializing in the niche of residential mortgage defaults and
remedies for over three decades, I hope to share a practical viewpoint of the
issues facing lenders, homeowners, and default servicing attorneys on a daily
basis. The problems are broader than subprime loan defaults, and the most
reasoned corrective approach will be one that marshals ideas from each party in
the value chain and brings together all stakeholders, including, in particular,
default servicing attorneys. This Article highlights current challenges
practitioners and industry professionals face in dealing with residential
mortgage defaults and foreclosures, current opportunities to improve loss
mitigation efforts, and the transitional history of the legal practitioners' role in
loss mitigation. The Article proposes several actions to encourage expansion of
the role of attorneys in the foreclosure remediation process, advocating a
holistic approach to the problem. The Article concludes that to accomplish the
daunting task of restoring the nation's financial health, banking industry
regulators should decrease restrictions on and increase incentives for attorneys
so that they can bring their unique skills to bear on loss mitigation efforts.
11.

OBSTACLES TO SUCCESSFUL FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE

Defaulting mortgages cost banks a great deal of money-more than any
alternative to foreclosure. Not only are banks not receiving the payments the
mortgagor promised to make, but they are also bearing the costs of foreclosure4
and the costs to carry the various properties until the banks can resell them.
The average loss an investor bears varies from 30%-60% of the outstanding
loan balance at the time of default, depending on the length of the holding
period. 5 It is certainly in the lender's best interest to attempt to avoid foreclosure
and keep homeowners in their homes when possible. 6 So-called workout plans,
such as forbearance agreements, repayment plans, and loan modifications, are
beneficial for both lenders and homeowners. However, because foreclosures are
so expensive for banks, banks are often reluctant to sink additional financial
resources to expand servicing efforts for defaulting loans. 7 The decision to

Reckless? You're in Luck, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at C,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/business/19norris.html ("If an activity is important enough to
justify a government nationalization to prevent a default, it is important enough to be regulated.").
3. CHARLES A. CAPONE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROVIDING
ALTERNATIVES TO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 38 (1996),

http://huduser.org/Publications/pdf/alt.pdf
4. See id.
5. Id. at 39. Losses increase for riskier loans and also in markets where real estate prices are
declining. Id.
6. See id. at 3.
7. See id. at 37.
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invest additional funds into the area of foreclosure avoidance is counterintuitive
from a business standpoint, although it is often the best possible solution.
At the outset, it is important to understand the nuanced difference between
mortgage lender-brokers and mortgage servicers-two parties in the mortgage
banking industry. Often mortgage lender-brokers and mortgage servicers are
lumped together in one category, but in fact the two perform very different
functions. Mortgage lender-brokers originate consumer mortgage loans in
discrete transactions from receiving loan applications to loan closings, 9 whereas
mortgage servicers manage loans on an ongoing basis, processing monthly
mortgage pa yments and developing relationships with mortgagors over the life
of the loans.
Although mortgage lender-brokers have several organizations that advocate
on their behalf," legislators often overlook mortgage servicers as entities that
could provide valuable input in legislative responses. From a practical2
standpoint, it is mortgage servicers that have ongoing contact with borrowers,'
and as such, servicers are most often the first ones with the opportunity to
interact with distressed borrowers and identify appropriate solutions to avoid
foreclosures. However, as discussed below, there are several reasons why loan
servicers have difficulty successfully avoiding foreclosures or mitigating their
losses.

8. See, e.g.,
id.at4 (referring to "[1]ender/servicers").
9. See, e.g.,
Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in
Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 185 (2003) (explaining how borrowers interact with mortgage brokers
and the tasks mortgage brokers typically fulfill).
10. See Div. OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., FED. TRADE COMM'N, MORTGAGE SERVICING:
MAKING SURE YOUR PAYMENTS COUNT 1-4 (2008), http://www.fic.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/
homes/real0.pdf (listing the duties of a mortgage servicer). Occasionally lenders will keep and
service their own loans; however, most lenders immediately sell their loans to a different entity
that will repackage and service the loans. See id.In the alternative, lenders sell the loans but retain
servicing rights. Jennifer Tescher, Viewpoint: Blending Global Capital with Local Ideas,
AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 26, 2008, at 11.

11. See, e.g.,
National Association of Mortgage Brokers, http://www.namb.org (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009) ("The National Association of Mortgage Brokers is the voice of the mortgage
broker industry ....); South Carolina Mortgage Brokers Association, http://www.scmba.org (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009) (describing how the group advocates for the mortgage profession).
12. See, e.g.,
Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance
Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing FinancialMarkets, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 1261,
1268 (1991) (discussing the various types of contact that servicers have with borrowers).
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DramaticIncreases in the Number ofDelinquencies and Foreclosures

Since 2005, both the number of properties with foreclosure filings and the
total number of foreclosure filings have steadily increased nationally. In 2007,
the total number of foreclosure filings increased by 75%, and the number of
households in foreclosure increased by 79%. 14 Mid-2008 estimates projected the
year ending with 1.9 million households in foreclosure, 3.2 million foreclosure
filings nationwide,15 and 1 million real estate owned (REO) properties.16 At the
end of the third quarter of 2008, almost 7% of all residential mortgage loans
were in default. 17 This percentage includes all loans that are at least one
payment behind, but it does not include any loans that are currently in the
foreclosure process. 8 A total of 1.19% of all loans went into foreclosure in the
second quarter of 2008, which is a 12% increase over the first quarter of 2008
and an 83% increase over the comparable period in 2007.19 Delinquency rates
and foreclosure start rates on subprime loans were
much higher during the same
20
time period-18.67% and 4.70% respectively.
B.

Time Constraints

As agents for investors, servicers are charged with maximizing their
principals' financial return, and as such, they are faced with two competing
objectives: resolving defaults as quickly as possible while foreclosing as quickly
as possible. Loss mitigation teams must be assertive to achieve remediation in

13. See REALTYTRAC, FORECLOSURES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE HOUSING MARKET 8
(2008), http://mortgagecoalition.org/images/CMIS_ForeclosurePresentation.pps.
14. Id. at4.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 15. REO is "the term given to properties that become owned by the investor at the
foreclosure sale." Amy Crews Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default:
Policies and Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs 7 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper
No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/interventions in mortgage
default.pdf Institutional lenders and investors that purchase properties at a foreclosure sale
subsequently remarker their REO inventory to recoup financial losses sustained by the foreclosure.
See id. at 28.
17. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, National Delinquency Survey (Dec. 5, 2008),
availableat http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/66626.htm.
18. Id. The Mortgage Bankers Association did note, however, that every state except for
Alaska experienced an increase in the number of loans that were more than ninety days overdue
but not yet transferred into foreclosure. Id. This indicates that mortgage companies are not
referring loans for foreclosure due to loss mitigation efforts. Id.
19. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., U.S.
HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS:
3RD QUARTER 2008, at 20 (2008), available at

http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/fallO8/USHMCQ308.pdf
20. Id.
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advance of a foreclosure sale. 21 Despite increased staffing and training,
servicers struggle to accommodate the increasing backlog of loans as the
volume of delinquencies and foreclosure referrals steadily increases. 22
Additionally, the longer it takes to develop a workout plan, the more difficult it
becomes for delinquent borrowers to overcome additional
interest, late charges,
23
and foreclosure costs and reinstate their mortgage.
In order to truly avoid foreclosure, a mortgage servicer must examine a
troubled borrower's personal and financial situation and tailor an appropriate
solution to solve that individual's problems; in other words, one must "[treat
the disease, not the symptom." 24 There is no universal remedy because each
borrower's financial and personal situation is different, and accordingly, the
nature and • extent
of information required
and assessment processes employed
•
25
will be different for each borrower. The borrower's particular loan product

21. See id.at34 (..The key is getting the loss-mitigation process started much earlier than
ever before."' (quoting Paul J.Wright, senior vice president of sales and marketing for DRI
Management Systems, Inc.)). Additionally, federal regulations provide guidelines for engaging in
loss mitigation, 24 C.F.R. § 203.501 (2008) (detailing the loss mitigation evaluation and action
requirements), incentives for successful mitigations, 38 C.F.R. § 36.4819 (2008) (paying an
incentive bonus for each successful loss mitigation alternative to foreclosure), and penalties for
failure to engage in loss mitigation, 24 C.F.R. § 30.35(a)(15), (c)(2) (2008) (authorizing civil
action against mortgagee or lender who fails to engage in loss mediation and allowing treble
damages for a violation).
22. See Neil J. Morse, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug.
2008, at 28, 31 (noting that one servicer has increased its
loss mitigation staffby as much as 60%);
Fannie
Mae,
Lender
Announcement
08-14
(June
16,
2008),
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2008/0814.pdf (outlining the Fannie Mae
workout hierarchy that recommends the preferred order of consideration for the use of loss
mitigation options to resolve a delinquency); 2 FREDDIE MAC, SINGLE-FAMILY SELLER/SERVICER

GUIDE, chs. 64-68 (2009), http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide (follow "AllRegs" hyperlink)
(focusing on obtaining quality information prior to selecting and obtaining approval for workout
plans); see also Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm'r,
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees (Oct. 17, 2008), http:/
www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/08-32ml.doc (requiring mortgagees to
send loss mitigation information to counsel for borrowers that have filed for bankruptcy without
first obtaining relief from the automatic stay).
23. Cutts & Merrill, supra note 16, at 35-36. Despite pleas from consumer advocacy
groups, an average of 84% of foreclosure costs are interest arrearages, taxes and insurance-costs
that are present in both performing loans and delinquent loans. Id.at 37. A mere 11% of
foreclosure costs are attorneys' fees, although these tend to be higher in states with judicial
foreclosures. Id.Cutts and Merrill suggest that less successful loss mitigation in states with longer
foreclosure timelines is the result of borrowers' decreased sense of urgency and a decrease in the
borrowers' incentives to reinstate their mortgages. Id.
24. Dona DeZube, A Survival Guide, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 2007, at32, 36.
25. See CAPONE, supranote 3, at25.
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• 26

also governs the resolution. Offering an inappropriate remedy will not prevent
foreclosure, it will only prolong or postpone the foreclosure process and
increase costs to servicers and borrowers. Careful and deliberate loss mitigation
is a "time-consuming, manual, hands-on process," 27 during which a servicer
must spend time analyzing each delinquent borrower's particular financial
and
28
personal information to assess problems and develop potential solutions.
Recognizing that foreclosures are at historic highs, servicers already
understand the benefit of avoiding foreclosure and are exploring new ways to
engage borrowers in loss mitigation activities. 29 Despite many servicers'
proactive efforts, delinquent or distressed borrowers are often reluctant to
cooperate with attempts to initiate the loss mitigation process. National news
media coverage of rising foreclosure rates has increased borrower awareness,
yet more than half of delinquent borrowers are not aware of or ignore the reality
that servicers could assist them with a workout plan, and the borrowers
ultimately lose their homes without speaking to their servicers. 31 Even
borrowers who initially
S• 32 speak with servicers do not always follow through with
workout negotiations.
111. LOSS MITIGATION EFFORTS AND THE LEGAL PRACTITIONER

Despite the difficulties mortgage servicers face in loss mitigation efforts,
demand for loss mitigation has increased rapidly in recent years. Bank of
America experienced a 407% increase in foreclosure remediation in the first

26. See, e.g.,
Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing
Financial Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 266 (2008) (suggesting that lenders should
recommend loan products appropriate to a borrower's financial situation).
27. See Morse, supra note 22, at31.
28. See CAPONE, supranote 3, at25.
29. See Cutts & Merrill, supranote 16, at5 & n.4. Cutts and Merrill note that "[s]ome ofthe
more creative servicers mail prepaid disposable cell phones with the servicer's number
programmed in to delinquent borrowers. Others send calling cards worth $5 or $10, and still
others
offer cash payments or entry into a prize drawing ifthe borrower returns the servicer's call." Id. at
5 n.4.
30. Dean C. Williams, There's Got to Be a Better Way, MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb. 2006, at
52, 57 (explaining that 92% of delinquent homeowners who recalled a servicer contacting them did
not follow up with the servicer because the homeowners thought the lender could not help).
31. See Cutts & Merrill, supra note 16, at10-11.
32. See DeZube, supra note 24, at 37. DeZube highlights one servicer's comments that
equated requesting borrowers to complete loss mitigation package paperwork with requesting
borrowers to file income tax returns. Id.Other servicers have experienced better results by prefilling worksheet blanks with a distressed borrower's financial and personal information that the
servicer already has on file. Id.
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eight months of 2008 from the comparable period in 2007, 33 and the Hope Now
Alliance is expecting to assist 40% more homeowners to avoid foreclosure in
2008 over the same time period as the previous year. 34 This dramatic increase in
volume is resulting in increases in the length of time required to process a
workout plan, 35 and the continually rising volume of delinquent loans shows no
signs of slowing.36 Mortgage servicers are severely pressed to provide adequate
coverage of the expanded loss mitigation demands.
A.

Why Attorneys?

Default attorneys have the greatest opportunity to employ their skills in
negotiating remedial solutions that preserve performing mortgages in the area of
loss mitigation, albeit at some possible diminution of return to investors. In fact,
since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis, third parties seem to be
experiencing higher success rates in assisting defaulting borrowers than
servicers. For example, the Hope Now Alliance boasts a letter campaign
response rate six times higher than that of servicers, 37 and attorneys similarly
see better response rates from distressed borrowers. 38 Some investors and
servicers are also experimenting with third-party credit counselors to increase
rates of contact with delinquent borrowers,39 even though
industry professionals
40
remain concerned about data integrity in such situations.
The presence of independent agencies and other third parties creates an
additional, significant staffing issue for servicers in that the agencies' successes
in reaching mortgagors have increased the demand on servicers to meet normal
response times. 4 ' Moreover, timely hiring and expedited training of an adequate
number of professionals to handle loss mitigation programs has presented its

33. Lisa Zagaroli, BofA Claims Success in Halting Foreclosures,CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Sept. 18, 2008, at ID.
34. Hope Now Sees Record Monthly Workouts, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, at
II [hereinafter Hope Now].
35. See Emily Flitter, In Focus: In Loan Mods, Process Isn't Quite Progress, AMERICAN
BANKER, Sept. 8, 2008, at 1.
36. See Cutts & Merrill, supra note 16, at 39.
37. Hope Now, supranote 34, at 12.
38. Williams, supra note 30, at 57. The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) both instituted pilot
programs in which foreclosure law firms, rather than servicers, provided loss mitigation packages
to delinquent borrowers. Id. Reports indicated that 60% of borrowers called the law firm, and 40%
ofthose borrowers completed and returned the package. Id.
39. See Cutts & Merrill, supra note 16, at 5.
40. See Flitter, supra note 35, at 2.
41. Cf Morse, supra note 22, at 30 (acknowledging the success ofthe Hope Now Alliance
and criticism of the length of time servicers take to modify loans, but stating that the "criticism
rings a bit hollow" because "servicers are facing an almost unprecedented challenge").
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own challenges to servicers. 42 Offshore call centers, designed 4to3 take basic
inquiries from mortgagors, offer little assistance in loan resolution.
Many lenders and investors now recognize that employing their default
attorneys could substantially reduce their burden. Default attorneys have skills
that are valuable in the loss mitigation sphere: "Lawyers are clearly positioned
to be part of the solution by training, inclination and level of discourse."44 By
nature, attorneys are problem solvers and advocates, and the law holds them to
certain ethical standards. Furthermore, their area of practice requires default
attorneys to understand the complexities of the mortgage finance industry and
the quagmire of
45 state and federal regulations which entwine securitized
mortgage pools.
The brief period following a mortgagor's default between the cessation of
the servicer's in-house collection efforts and referral of the matter for
foreclosure offers another prime opportunity for attorneys to expand loss
mitigation efforts. 46 Contact from an attorney often jolts a mortgagor out of
inaction, resulting in greater cooperation before a foreclosure ever
47
commences.
After the bank initiates foreclosure, default attorneys' superior knowledge
of a case's status and deadlines uniquely equips them to expand loss mitigation
efforts in ways that simultaneously prevent unnecessary delays and increased
costs to servicers and borrowers alike. Additionally, in states having a judicial
foreclosure process, default attorneys' management of loss mitigation can assist
the courts by avoiding contentious or unnecessary litigation which would
require substantial court time.

42. See DeZube supra note 24, at38-39; Morse, supranote 22.
43. But cf DeZube, supra note 24, at38 (suggesting that servicers that offer loss mitigation
borrowers "a self-service option for routine questions about balances" might deflect calls that
would otherwise occupy the time of loss mitigation agents, thus maximizing human interaction for
difficult cases).
44. Joe Surkiewicz, Commentary: Of Service: How Can a Lawyer Help Those Facing
Foreclosure?,DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, Md.), Aug. 4, 2008.
45. See Morse, supra note 22. One industry professional noted that "[m]odifying and
restructuring of loans is problematic," and "no one knows how to do ityet, because there are so
many legal consequences of loans being in different pools, and what does itmean [in terms of
those legal consequences] to modify them." Id.(second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
46. See, e.g.,Reni Gertner, Layers Lend Hands to Homeowners, ST. PAUL LEGAL
LEDGER, Aug. 23, 2007 (noting that "inmost instances" an attorney can take steps "to stop a
foreclosure").
47. See id.
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Why Are Attorneys Largely Uninvolved?

During the 1980s and 1990s, attorneys were substantially involved in the
loss mitigation process. 48 However, more recently, attorneys have been
excluded from the process for two main reasons. First, the investors' loss
mitigation programs create financial incentives for lenders who engage in
successful remediation, so lenders have developed in-house loss mitigation
departments. 49 Second, Congress removed the "attorney exception" from the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),50• •51
and
• attorneys now face major
obstacles to engage meaningfully in loss mitigation efforts.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) all
offer incentives to lenders who successfully engage in loss mitigation. 52
Although Fannie Mae has recently developed a pilot program whereby it offers
financial incentives for successful foreclosure avoidance to attorneys and
lenders,53 neither Freddie Mac, the VA, nor the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) have followed suit. Freddie Mac remains focused
on obtaining better information regarding a borrower's personal and financial
status to ensure that whatever loss mitigation alternative is ultimately selected, it
will best meet the investor's and the borrower's needs.54 Although Freddie Mac
does not offer financial incentives to attorneys, foreclosure attorneys are now
permitted to postpone foreclosure sales without prior approval by Freddie Mac

48. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2289 (2008).
49. See CAPONE, supranote 3, at ix.
50. Act of July 9, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Star. 768 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006)).
51. See generally Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lending Liability: Changing or Enforcing the
Ground Rules?, 33 S.D. L. REV. 387, 420 & n.171 (citing Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006)) (describing debt collection torts that "provided the impetus for
federal regulation of collection practices" and noting that attorneys are now subject to the
FDCPA).
52. See, e.g., Servicer Loss-mitigation Options and Incentives, 38 C.F.R. § 36.4819 (2008)
(paying an incentive bonus for each successful loss mitigation alternative to foreclosure); News
Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae to Increase Cash Incentives Paid to Servicers to Avoid
Foreclosure (July 30, 2008), http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2008/4439.jhtml?pMedia&s-News+ Releases (discussing Fannie Mae's incentive program); FREDDIE MAC,
WORKOUT INCENTIVE PROGRAM (2008), http://www.freddiemac.com/service/factsheets/pdf/
workout incentiveprogram_374.pdf (detailing Freddie Mac's incentives for servicers that help
borrowers avoid foreclosure).
53. Daniel H. Mudd, President & Chief Executive Officer, Fannie Mae, Address at National
Association of Home Builders 2008 International Builders' Show 2 (Feb. 13, 2008),
http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/Dan Hm Builders lnt 021308.pdf
54. See, e.g., FREDDIE MAC, AFFORDABLE SERVICING BEST PRACTICES FOR HOUSING
COUNSELORS 2 (2006), http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/community/bp hc.pdf (discussing
how collecting accurate financial information gives an underlying foundation for intervention).
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56
if a workout plan is imminent. This is a major departure from its past policy.
The VA has not expanded its loss mitigation process or incentives to attorneys
either, but it has begun taking mortgage assignments
back
from servicers and
S
•
57
recasting mortgage terms through loan modifications. HUD awards treble
damages against servicers who fail to engage in loss mitigation,5 8 but continues
to exclude attorneys from any financial incentives in the foreclosure avoidance
process. Either because these financial incentives are available only for lenders
and not for attorneys performing loss mitigation functions or because lenders
want to keep these incentives for themselves, attorneys do not play a large role
in loss mitigation.
Additionally, the FDCPA no longer exempts attorneys from its
requirements and now subjects attorneys to statutory damages even for technical
violations. When Congress first enacted the FDCPA, it did not classify
60
attorneys as "debt collectors"; thus, the FDCPA did not bind attorneys. This
changed in 1986, when "Congress repealed this exemption thereby requiring
attorneys to comply with the standards of conduct imposed by the FDCPA on
lay 'debt collectors."' 6 ' Now, attorneys must ensure that their staff complies
with all aspects of the FDCPA,
particularly including notice, debt validation,
S
62
and disclosure requirements. In the event an attorney (or a member of the
attorney's staff) violates one of these provisions, the attorney is strictly liable,
and the debtor is entitled to statutory damages regardless of whether the debtor
sustained any actual damages. 63 The debtor may also be entitled to attorneys'
fees. 64 These strict liability provisions make it increasingly difficult for
attorneys to engage meaningfully in loss mitigation for an increasing number of

55. See Bulletin from Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Servicers 12 (Dec. 12, 2008),
availableat http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bII 121208.pdf
56. See 2 FREDDIE MAC, SINGLE-FAMILY SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE, ch. 66.11 (2009),
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide (follow "AllRegs" hyperlink).
57. See, e.g., Saint Paul Regional Office RLC Foreclosure Alternatives, U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs, http://www.vba.va.gov/ro/central/stpau/Servicers/foreclosurealternatives.html#
Anchor-60088 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (listing "loan modification" as one option available to
the VA if a servicer is not working).

58. See 24 C.F.R. § 30.35(a)(14), (c)(2) (2008).
59. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60. Christopher A. Golden, Fair Debt Collection PracticesAct... An Emerging Source of
Liability for Attorneys, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1997, at 14, 14 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-405, at 8
(1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1759).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 15-16.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2006).
64. See Golden, supra note 60, at 16 (citing Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d
Cir. 1991); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1989); Emanuel
v. Am. Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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foreclosure referrals, and the provisions significantly curb attorneys' potential
effectiveness in resolving delinquencies and avoiding foreclosures.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In this unprecedented legal and financial environment, industry
professionals can no longer rely on their experience. This terra nova is forcing
stakeholders to develop innovative ways to cope with their hemorrhaging losses
and insurmountable workloads. Lenders, brokers, servicers, attorneys,
policymakers, and consumers must combine their perspectives to develop a
holistic approach to avoiding foreclosures and emerging from the crisis as
soundly as possible. Attorneys are vital parties to these discussions. Not only do
attorneys' advocacy skills and legal knowledge make them invaluable
resources, but attorneys also have a higher success rate at engaging borrowers in
effective loss mitigation.6 5 They are in courtrooms on a daily basis, wading
through these very issues with hundreds of homeowners, lenders, judges, and
other attorneys. They see the action first hand and have a unique perspective on
how tinkering with legislation and policy could affect the outcome of loss
mitigation efforts and foreclosures-for better or for worse.66
Although Congress has already enacted some legislation, this legislation
will not be fully implemented until attorneys can be involved in a meaningful
way. The Housing Economic Recovery Act of 200867 establishes the Hope for
Homeowners Program and provides for loan modifications for eligible

65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. Several organizations, such as CARES and the Coalition for Mortgage Industry
Solutions (CMIS), have already demonstrated this understanding of and appreciation for the unique
role of attorneys. Both of these organizations seek to foster communication among professionals
throughout the mortgage banking industry and promote solutions that can be implemented without
unintended or unforeseen consequences. The CARES mission is "[t]o address our clients' needs
and the nation's interests related to the mortgage industry's issues and challenges through
forwarding the best legal opinions and processes resulting in superior long term solutions."
Mission and Vision Statements, CARES UPDATE (Comm. for Actual Real Estate Solutions, Inc.,
Newport, Ky.), Oct. 2008, at4. The CMIS states that itsaim is to provide a "neutral forum and
framework to foster dialogue necessary to convert diverse self-interests into comprehensive
solutions or priorities for all as well as participants, including borrowers and consumers."
COALITION FOR MORTGAGE
ASSESSING THE MORTGAGE,

INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS,
CREDIT, AND CAPITAL

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP SUMMIT:
MARKETS CRISIS AND EXPLORING

INDUSTRY-BASED SOLUTIONS (June 17, 2008), http://www.mortgagecoalition.org/pdf/062008/
CMIS_AssessingMortgageCreditCapitalMarkets_Crisis.pdf While itis too early to tell what
impact these organizations will have because they are both relatively new creations, the dialogue
among diverse industry professionals will certainly be beneficial.
67. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
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homeowners; 68 however, engaging borrowers and soliciting participation in this
program is similar to typical loss mitigation efforts-a prime opportunity for
attorney participation. If investors altered their incentive programs to make
attorneys eligible recipients, servicers would be more likely to shift the
burdensome task of engaging distressed borrowers, and attorneys would have an
incentive to engage borrowers in foreclosure mitigation.
Additionally, revisions to the FDCPA 69 could make a major difference in
the practical ability of attorneys to engage distressed borrowers in loss
mitigation. Minor changes to two definitions- "communication, 0 and "debt
collector" 1 -would preserve the current consumer protections but permit
attorneys to participate in loss mitigation activities. Currently, the definition of
communication is "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or
indirectly to any person through any medium. 72 This certainly includes sending
information to or soliciting information from borrowers regarding workout
plans and other options to prevent foreclosure because it is related to the
borrowers' defaulted mortgage debt. If Congress added a short clause to this
definition to carve out an exception for loss mitigation efforts or options in lieu
of a residential mortgage foreclosure, this would protect borrowers from
undesirable harassment but still allow attorneys to actively communicate with
distressed borrowers to save the borrowers' homes from foreclosure.
Additionally, Congress should change the definition of debt collector 73 to add
an exclusion for attorneys to the preexisting list of parties that the statute does
not consider debt collectors. This provision should include licensed attorneys or
their supervised staff members so long as the primary purpose of the
communication is to explore home retention or loss mitigation activity. These
two small definitional changes could make a significant difference in the
potential liability to which attorneys are exposed when they seek to engage
borrowers in loss mitigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the task of developing regulatory solutions to restore the financial
health of the mortgage banking industry, the nation, and the world is a daunting
one, an effective, deliberate response is possible. However, in order to
accomplish this task, parties from throughout the industry must innovate a

68.
U.S.C.A.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at § 1402, 122 Star. at 2800 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23); see 12
§ 1715z-23 (West 2008).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a- 692p (2006).
See id. § 1692a(2).
See id. § 1692a(6).
§ 1692a(2).
§ 1692a(6).
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holistic approach. Attorneys have invaluable skills and a unique vantage point
that make them indispensable players not only in policy discussions but also in
directly engaging distressed borrowers in loss mitigation. Regulators should
release the fetters, increase the incentives, and allow attorneys to do what they
are trained to do-solve problems.
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